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ABSTRACT
In this paper we investigate the ability of generative adversarial
networks (GANs) to synthesize spoofing attacks on modern
speaker recognition systems. We first show that samples gen-
erated with SampleRNN and WaveNet are unable to fool a
CNN-based speaker recognition system. We propose a modi-
fication of the Wasserstein GAN objective function to make
use of data that is real but not from the class being learned.
Our semi-supervised learning method is able to perform both
targeted and untargeted attacks, raising questions related to
security in speaker authentication systems.
1. INTRODUCTION
Speaker authentication systems are being deployed for security
critical applications in industries like banking, forensics, and
home automation. Like other domains, such industries have
benefited from recent advancements in deep learning that lead
to improved accuracy and trainability of the speech authen-
tication systems. Despite the improvement in the efficiency
of these systems, evidence shows that they can be susceptible
to adversarial attacks[1], thus motivating a current focus on
understanding adversarial attacks ([2], [3]), finding counter-
measures to detect and deflect them and designing systems that
are provably correct with respect to mathematically-specified
requirements [4].
Parallel to advancements in speech authentication, neural
speech generation (the process of using deep neural networks
to generate speech) has also seen huge progress in recent years
[5]. The combination of these advancements begs a natural
question that has, to the best of our knowledge, not yet been
answered:
Are speech authentication systems robust
to adversarial attacks by speech generative models?
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) are generative
models that recently have been used to produce incredibly
authentic samples in a variety of fields. The core idea of
GANs, a minimax game played between a generator network
and a discriminator network, extends naturally to the field of
speaker authentication and spoofing.
With regards to this question, we offer in this research the
following contributions:
• We evaluate samples produced with SampleRNN and
WaveNet in their ability to fool text-independent speaker
recognizers.
• We propose strategies for untargeted attacks using Gen-
erative Adversarial Networks.
• We propose a semi-supervised approach for targeted
attacks by modifying Wasserstein’s GAN loss function.
2. RELATEDWORK
Modern generative models are sophisticated enough to produce
fake1 speech samples that can be indistinguishable from real
human speech. In this section, we provide a summary of some
existing neural speech synthesis models and their architectures.
WaveNet [6] is a generative neural network that is trained
end-to-end to model quantized audio waveforms. The model is
fully probabilistic and autoregressive, using a stack of causal
convolutional layers to condition the predictive distribution
for each audio sample on all previous ones. It has produced
impressive results for generation of speech audio conditioned
on speaker and text and has become a standard baseline for
neural speech generative models.
SampleRNN [7] is another autoregressive architecture that
has been successfully used to generate both speech and music
samples. SampleRNN uses a hierarchical structure of deep
RNNs to model dependencies in the sample sequence. Each
deep RNN operates at a different temporal resolution so as to
model both long term and short term dependencies.
Recent work on deep learning architectures has also intro-
duced the presence of adversarial examples: small perturba-
tions to the original inputs, normally imperceptible to humans,
which nevertheless cause the architecture to generate an in-
correct or deliberately chosen output. In their brilliant papers,
[2] and [3] analyze the origin of adversarial attacks and de-
scribe simple and very efficient techniques for creating such
perturbations, such as the fast gradient sign method (FGSM).
In the vision domain, [8] describe a technique for attack-
ing facial recognition systems. Their attacks are physically
realizable and inconspicuous, allowing an attacker to imper-
sonate another individual. In the speech domain, [9] describe
1We use the term fake to refer to computer generated samples
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attacks on speech-recognition systems which use sounds that
are hard to recognize by humans but interpreted as specific
commands by speech-recognition systems.
To the best of our knowledge, GANs have not been used
for the purpose of speech synthesis2. [10] uses a conditional
GAN for the purpose of speech enhancement, i.e. taking as
input a raw speech signal and outputting a denoised waveform.
The model in [11] tackles the reverse problem of using GANs
to learn certain representations given a speech spectrogram.
3. ATTACKING SPEAKER RECOGNITION MODELS
3.1. Neural speaker recognition system
The speaker recognition system used in our experiments is
based on the framework by [12] and is described in Figure 1.
The first module at the bottom is a pre-processing step that
extracts the Mel-Spectrogram from the waveform as described
in section 4.2. The second module is a convolutional neural
network (CNN) that performs multi-speaker classification us-
ing the Mel-Spectrogram. The CNN is a modified version of
Alexnet [13]. We warn the readers that unlike [12], our clas-
sifier operates on 64 by 64 Mel-Spectrogram and has slightly
different number of nodes on each layer.
64 x 64 Mel-Spectrogram
L1: convolution 3x3x32
L2: max pooling 2x2
L3: convolution 3x3x64
L4: max pooling 2x2
L5: dense 1024
L6: dropout 50%
L7: dense 103
L8: softmax
labels
Fig. 1: Architecture for CNN speaker verifier.
We train our speaker classifier using 64 by 64 Mel-
Spectrograms 3 from 3 speech datasets, including 100 speak-
ers from NIST 2004, speaker p280 from CSTR VCTK and
the single speaker in Blizzard. Our speaker classifier has a
rejection path, the “other” class, trained on environmental
sounds using samples from the ESC-50 dataset. Our model
achieves approximately 85% test set accuracy
3.2. Adversarial attacks
We define adversarial attacks on speaker recognition systems
as targeted or untargeted. In targeted attacks, an adversary
2More specifically, Mel-Spectrogram synthesis
364 mel bands and 64 frames, 100 ms each
Speakers Language Duration Context
2013 Blizzard 1 English 73 h Book narration
CSTR VCTK 109 English 400 Sentences Newspaper narration
2004 NIST 100 Multiple 5 min / speaker Conversational phone speech.
ESC 50 50 N/A 4 min / class Environmental sounds.
Table 1: Description of the datasets used in our experiments.
is interested in designing an input that makes the classifica-
tion system predict a target class chosen by the adversary. In
untargeted attacks, the adversary is interested in a confident
prediction, regardless of the class being predicted as long as it
is not the "other" class. Untargeted attacks are essentially de-
signed to fool the classifier into thinking a fake speech sample
is real. Note that a successful targeted attack is by definition a
successful untargeted attack as well.
4. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
4.1. Datasets
In our experiments we use three speech datasets and one
dataset with environmental sounds, as shown in Table 1. The
datasets used are public and provide audio clips of different
lengths, quality, language and content. In addition to the
samples listed in Table 1, we used globally conditioned sam-
pleRNN and WaveNet fake samples available on the web. The
samples generated with sampleRNN and WaveNet are from
the Blizzard dataset and CSTR VCTK (P280) respectively.
4.2. Pre-processing
Data pre-processing is dependent on the model being trained.
For SampleRNN and WaveNet, the raw audio is reduced to
16kHz and quantized using the µ-law companding transforma-
tion as referenced in [7] and [6]. For the model based on the
Wasserstein GAN, we pre-process the data by converting it
to 16kHz and removing silences by using the WebRTC Voice
Activity Detector (VAD) as referenced in [14]. For the CNN
speaker recognition system, the data is pre-processed by re-
sampling to 16kHz when necessary and removing silences by
using the aforemetioned VAD.
4.3. Feature extraction
SampleRNN and WaveNet operate at the sample level, i.e.
waveform, thus requiring no feature extraction. The features
used for the neural speaker recognition system are based on
Mel-Spectrograms with dynamic range compression. The Mel-
Spectrogram is obtained by projecting a spectrogram onto a
mel scale. We use the python library librosa to project the
spectrogram onto 64 mel bands, with window size equal to
1024 samples and hop size equal to 160 samples, i.e. 100ms
long frames. Dynamic range compression is computed as
described in [12], with log(1+C ∗M), where C is a compres-
sion constant scalar set to 1000 andM is a matrix representing
the Mel-Spectrogram. Training the GAN is also done with
Mel-Spectrograms of 64 bands and 64 frames image patch.
4.4. Models
4.4.1. WaveNet
Due to constraints on computing power and the extreme diffi-
culty in training WaveNet 4, we used samples from WaveNet
models that had been pre-trained for 88 thousand iterations.
Parameters of the models were kept the same as those in [6].
The ability of WaveNet to perform untargeted attacks amounts
to using a model trained on an entire corpus. Targeted attacks
are more difficult - we found that a single speaker’s data was
not enough to train WaveNet to converge successfully. To
construct speaker-dependent samples, we relied on samples
from pre-trained models that were globally conditioned on
speaker ID. Based on informal listening experiments, such
samples do sound very similar to the real speech of the speaker
in question.
4.4.2. sampleRNN
Similarly to WaveNet, we found that the best (least noisy) sam-
pleRNN samples came from models which were pretrained
with a high number of iterations. Accordingly, we obtained
samples from the three-tiered architecture, trained on the
Blizzard 2013 dataset [15], which as mentioned in Section 3
is a 300 hour corpus of a single female speaker’s narration.
We also downloaded samples from online repositories, in-
cluding samples from the original paper’s online repository
at https://soundcloud.com/samplernn/sets,
which we qualitatively found to have less noise than ours.
4.4.3. WGAN
In all of our experiments, we use the Wasserstein GAN with
gradient penalty (WGAN-GP), which we found makes the
model converge better than regular WGAN [16] or GAN [17].
In our experiments, we trained a WGAN-GP to produce mel-
spectrograms from 1 target speaker against a set of 101 speak-
ers. On each critic iteration, we fed it with a batch of samples
from one target speaker, and a batch of data uniformly sampled
from the other speakers. We used two popular architectures
for generator/critic pairs: DCGAN [18] and ResNet [19].
Performing untargeted attacks with the WGAN-GP (i.e.,
training the network to output speech samples that mimic the
distribution of speech) is relatively straightforward: we simply
train the WGAN-GP using all speakers in our dataset. How-
ever, the most natural attack is one that is targeted: where the
GAN is trained to directly fool a speaker recognition system,
4Our community has not been able to replicate the results in Google’s
WaveNet paper
i.e., to produce samples that the system classifies as matching
a target speaker with reasonable confidence.
4.4.4. WGAN-GP with modified objective function
A naive approach for targeted attacks is to train the GAN
on the data of the single target speaker. A drawback of this
approach is that the critic, and by consequence the generator,
does not have access to universal properties of speech5. To
circumvent this problem, we rely on semi-supervised learning
and propose a modification to the critic’s objective function
that allows it to learn to differentiate between not only real
samples and generated samples, but also between real speech
samples from a target speaker and real speech samples from
other speakers. We do this by adding a term to the critic’s
loss that encourages its discriminator to classify real speech
samples from untargeted speakers as fake:
E
x˜∼Pg
[
D(x˜)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Generated Samples
+α ∗ E
x˙∼Px˙
[
D(x˙)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Different Speakers
− E
x∼Pr
[
D(x)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Real Speaker
+λ E
xˆ∼Pxˆ
[
(‖∇xˆD(xˆ)‖2 − 1)2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gradient Penalty
,
(1)
where Pxˆ is the distribution of samples from other speakers
and α is a tunable scaling factor. Note that equation 1 is
no longer a direct approximation of the Wasserstein distance.
Rather, it provides a balance of the distance between both the
fake distribution and real one, and the distance between other
speakers’ distribution and the target speaker’s one. We refer to
this objective function as mixed loss.
Initially, we were able to converge the targeted loss model
used the same parameters as [20], namely 5 critic iterations per
generator iteration, a gradient penalty weight of 10, and batch
size of 64. Both the generator and critic were trained using
the Adam optimizer [21]. However, under these parameters
we found that the highest α weight we could successfully use
was 0.1 (we found that not including this scaling factor led to
serious overfitting and poor convergence of the GAN).
In order to circumvent these problems and train a model
with α set to 1, we made modifications to the setup, including
setting the standard deviation of the DCGAN discriminator’s
weight initialization to 0.05 and iterations to 20. To accom-
modate the critic’s access to additional data in the mixed loss
function (4), we increased the generator’s learning rate. Fi-
nally, we added Gaussian noise to the target speaker data to
prevent overfitting.
5. RESULTS
5.1. GAN Mel-Spectrogram
Using the improved Wasserstein GANs framework, we trained
generators to construct 64x64 mel-spectrogram images from
a noise vector. Visual results are demonstrated below in Fig-
ure 2. We saw recognizable Mel-Spectrogram-like features in
5We draw a parallel with Universal Background Models in speech.
(a) Real (actual) (b) Fake (generated)
Fig. 2: Comparison of 6 real and fake mel-spectrogram sam-
ples from all speakers. (∼ 5000 generator iterations)
the data after only 1000 generator iterations, and after 5000
iterations the generated samples were indistinguishable from
real ones. Training took around 10 hours for 20000 iterations
on a single 4 GB Nvidia GK104GL GPU.
5.2. GAN Adversarial attacks
Within the GAN framework, we train models for untargeted at-
tacks by using all data available from speakers that the speaker
recognition systems was trained on, irrespective of class la-
bel. We show in subsection 5.2.1 that an untargeted model
able to generate data from the real distribution with enough
variety can be used to perform adversarial attacks. Figure 3a
depicts that our GAN-trained generator successfully learns all
speakers across the dataset, without mode collapsing.
As we described earlier, the models for targeted attacks
can be trained in two manners: 1) conditioning the model on
additional information, e.g. class labels, as described in [22];
2) using only data from the label of interest. While the first
approach might result in mode collapse, a drawback of the
second approach is that the discriminator, and by consequence
the generator, does not have access to universal6 properties of
speech. In the targeted attacks subsection 5.2.2 we show results
using our new objective function described in equation 1 that
allows using data from all speakers.
5.2.1. Untargeted attacks
For each speaker audio data in the test set, we compute a
Mel-Spectrogram as descibred in section 4.2. The resulting
Mel-Spectrogram is then fed into the CNN recognizer and
we extract a 1024-dimensional feature Φ from the first fully-
connected layer (L5) in the pre-trained CNN model (1) trained
on the real speech dataset with all speaker IDs. This deep
feature/embedding Φ is then used to train a K-nearest-neighbor
(KNN) classifier, with K equal to 5.
To control the generator trained by our WGAN-GP, we
feed the generated Mel-Spectrograms into the same CNN-L7
pipeline to extract their corresponding feature Φ̂. Utilizing
the pre-trained KNN, each sample is assigned to the nearest
speaker in the deep feature space. Therefore, we know which
speaker our generated sample belongs to when we attack our
6We draw a parallel with Universal Background Models in speech.
(a) Confusion matrix of un-
targeted model. x-axis cor-
responds to predicted label,
y-axis to ground truth.
(b) Histogram of predictions given
WGAN-GP and mixed loss mod-
els. Ground truth label: 0.
Fig. 3: Summary histograms of targeted attacks
CNN recognizer. We evaluate our controlled WGAN-GP sam-
ples against our CNN speaker recognition system, and the
confusion matrix can be found in Figure 3a.
5.2.2. Targeted attacks
We trained the WGAN-GP on the entirety of the NIST 2004
corpus (100 speakers), a single speaker (P280) from the VCTK
Corpus, and the single speaker from the Blizzard dataset. The
samples from the other models were either downloaded from
the web or created from WaveNet globally conditioned on the
single VCTK corpus speaker, and on SampleRNN trained only
on data from the Blizzard dataset. Results for the WGAN-GP
are demonstrated in Figure 3. In the samples generated with
sampleRNN and WaveNet models, none of the predictions
made by the classifier match the target speaker.
We also trained the WGAN-GP with and without the
mixed loss on different speakers. The histogram of predictions
in Figure 3b shows WGAN-GP results for speaker 0. The
improved WGAN-GP loss achieves 0.38 error rate and our
mixed loss achieves 0.12 error rate, producing a 75% increase
in accuracy.
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this research we have investigated the use of speech genera-
tive models to perform adversarial attacks on speaker recogni-
tion systems. We show that the samples from autoregressive
models we trained, i.e. SampleRNN and WaveNet, or down-
loaded from the web were not able to fool the CNN speaker
recognizers we used in this research. On the other hand, we
show that adversarial examples generated with GAN networks
are successful in performing targeted and untargeted adversar-
ial attacks given the speaker recognition used herein.
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